Abstract: The paper addresses the issue of optimal investments in innovations.
INTRODUCTION
If several large-scale gas pipeline projects compete for a new gas market, the choices of the commercialization times (stopping times), i.e., the times of finalizing the construction of the pipelines, determine the future structure of the market and thus become especially important. In the paper (Klaassen et al., 2001) , which motivated the present study, a detailed pipeline model based 1 The author is supported by the RFBR Grants 03-01-00373, 03-01-00474, 04-01-08085. on classical patterns of mathematical economics (see (Arrow and Kurz, 1970) , (Intriligator, 1971) ) was designed and a best reply dynamic adaptation algorithm originating from the theory of evolutionary games (see (Friedman, 1991) - (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988) , (Kaniovski et al., 2000) , (Kryazhimskii and Osipov, 1995) - (Kryazhimskii et al., 2001) , (Tarasyev, 1999) ) was used to estimate numerically the commercialization times for the pipeline projects competing nowadays for the Turkey gas market.
Rational choices of the commercialization times can be viewed as Nash equilibria in a game between the projects. The structure of this game is studied in terms of game theory (see (Basar and Olsder, 1982) , (Vorob'ev, 1977) ). A background of the gas infrastructure model (see (Klaassen et al., 2001) ) and constructions of the optimal timing problem (see (Barzel, 1968) , (Tarasyev and Watanabe, 2001) ) are employed.
The model takes into account the stages of construction and exploitation of the gas pipelines. In each level, the model is optimized and estimated using appropriate techniques of theory of optimal control and theory of differential games (see (Chernousko, 1994) , (Krasovskii and Subbotin, 1988) , (Pontryagin et al., 1962) ). In the game, the total benefits gained during the pipelines' life periods act as payoffs and commercialization times act as strategies. Our goal is to characterize the equilibria in the game of timing. A key point in the analysis is the observation that all player's best response commercialization times concentrate at two instants that are fixed in advance. This reduces decisionmaking to choosing between two fixed investment policies, fast and slow, with the prescribed commercialization times. An algorithm that finds all the Nash equilibria in the game of timing is described. The results of the modelbased analysis are given for two case studies: competing gas pipeline projects in the Caspian region, and the planned pipeline routes to the gas market in China.
GAME OF TIMING
A game-theoretic model of competition of two gas pipeline projects is constructed. Players 1 and 2 are associated with the investors of projects 1 and 2, respectively. Assuming that the starting time for making investments is 0, let us consider virtual positive commercialization times of projects 1 and 2 (i.e., the final times of the construction of the pipelines), t 1 and t 2 . Given a commercialization time, t i , player i (i = 1, 2) can estimate the cost, C i (t i ), for finalizing project i at time t i . The positive-valued cost functions C i (t i ) (i = 1, 2) are defined on the positive half-axis.
Assumption 2.1. For each player, i, the cost function, C i (t i ), is smooth, monotonically decreasing and convex.
In what follows, the rate of cost reduction for player i is understood as the positive-valued monotonically decreasing function
At any time t > 0, the price of gas and costs for extraction and transportation of gas determine the benefit rate of player 1, b 1 (t). The costs for extraction and transportation of gas do not depend on the state of project 2, whereas the price of gas depends on the presence of player 2 on the marketplace. Hence, the benefit rate b 1 (t) may take two values, upper -b 11 (t), and lower -
Similarly, let us introduce the upper and lower benefit rates of player 2 at time t, b 21 (t) and b 22 (t),
Let us assume that the positive-valued upper and lower benefit rates b i1 (t) and b i2 (t) (i = 1, 2) are continuous functions defined on the positive halfaxis.
Assumption 2.2. For every player i (i = 1, 2), the graph of the rate of cost reduction, a i (t), intersects the graph of the upper benefit rate, b i1 (t), from above at the unique point t − i > 0, and stays below it afterwards; similarly, the graph of a i (t) intersects the graph of b i2 (t) from above at the unique point t + i > 0, and stays below it afterwards.
It is clear that t
Denote by t 2 the commercialization time of player 2. The benefit rate of player 1, b 1 (t), equals b 11 (t) for t < t 2 and equals b 12 (t) for t ≥ t 2 . Let us stress the dependence of b 1 (t) on t 2 and write
Similarly, a commercialization time t 1 of project 1 determines the benefit rate of player 2 as
Given a commercialization time of player 1, t 1 , and a commercialization time of player 2, t 2 , the total benefits of the players are represented by the integrals
Assumption 2.3. For every positive t 1 and every positive t 2 the integrals B i (t 1 , t 2 ) (i = 1, 2) are finite.
Given commercialization times of the players, t 1 and t 2 , the total profit of player i is defined as
Let us define the game of timing for players 1 and 2 in line with the standards of game theory (see (Vorob'ev, 1977) ). In the game of timing, the strategies of player i (i = 1, 2) are the positive commercialization times, t i , for project i, and the payoff to player i, thanks to strategies t 1 and t 2 of players 1 and 2, respectively, is the total profit P i (t 1 , t 2 ).
NASH EQUILIBRIA
According to the standard terminology of game theory, a strategy t * 1 of player 1 is said to be a best response of player 1 to a strategy t 2 of player 2 if t * 1 maximizes the payoff to player 1, P 1 (t 1 , t 2 ), over the set of all strategies of player 1, t 1 :
Similarly, a strategy t * 2 of player 2 is said to be a best response of player 2 to a strategy t 1 of player 1 if t * 2 maximizes the payoff to player 2, P 2 (t 1 , t 2 ), over the set of all strategies of player 2, t 2 :
Any pair (t * 1 , t * 2 ), where t * 1 is a best response of player 1 to t * 2 and t * 2 is a best response of player 2 to t * 1 , is said to be a Nash equilibrium in the game of timing.
Our goal is to characterize the Nash equilibria in the game of timing. Let us start with analysis of the payoffs. The differentiation of P 1 (t 1 , t 2 ) with respect to t 1 yields
Let us take two arbitrary strategies of player 2, t 21 and t 22 > t 21 . As (9) shows,
for t 1 < t 21 and for t 1 > t 22 , and
for t 21 < t 1 < t 22 . One can state that beyond the time interval located between t 21 and t 22 , P 1 (t 1 , t 22 ) and P 1 (t 1 , t 21 ) have the same rate in t 1 , and within this interval P 1 (t 1 , t 22 ) declines in t 1 faster than P 1 (t 1 , t 21 ). Thanks to (6) and (5)
Proposition 3.1. For every t 1 > 0, the payoff to player 1, P 1 (t 1 , t 2 ), increases in t 2 ; moreover, given a t 21 > 0 and a t 22 > t 21 , one has P 1 (t 1 , t 22 ) = P 1 (t 1 , t 21 ) for t 1 ≥ t 22 , and P 1 (t 1 , t 22 ) > P 1 (t 1 , t 21 ) for t 1 < t 22 .
Symmetric arguments are valid for player 2.
Proposition 3.2. For every t 2 > 0, the payoff to player 2, P 2 (t 1 , t 2 ), increases in t 1 ; moreover, given a t 11 > 0 and a t 12 > t 11 , one has P 2 (t 12 , t 2 ) = P 2 (t 11 , t 2 ) for t 2 ≥ t 12 , and P 2 (t 12 , t 2 ) > P 2 (t 11 , t 2 ) for t 2 < t 12 .
Let us find the best responses of player 1 to a given strategy, t 2 , of player 2. It is easy enough to identify the intervals of growth and decline of the payoff P 1 (t 1 , t 2 ) as a function of t 1 . One can use (9) and refer to the points t − 1 and t + 1 , at which the graph of a 1 (t), intersects the graphs of b 11 (t) and b 12 (t).
(see (4)). Then the graph of a 1 (t 1 ) lies above the graph of b 1 (t 1 |t 2 ) for t 1 < t 
Since P 1 (t 
All best responses of player 1 to t 2 lie in the twoelement set {t 
The set of all best responses of player 1 tot 2 is {t the slow choice of player 1. Let us call alsot 2 the switch point for player 1.
Let us consider the function that associates to each strategy, t 2 , of player 2 the set of all best responses of player 1 to t 2 ; one can call it the best response function of player 1. The graph of the best response function of player 1 consists of the horizontal segment located strictly above the segment (0,t 2 ] on the t 2 -axis at level t 
The set of all best responses of player 2 tot 1 is {t the slow choice of player 2, andt 2 the switch point for player 2. Let us introduce also the best response function of player 2, which associates to each strategy, t 1 , of player 1 the set of all best responses of player 2 to t 1 . Nash equilibria (t * 1 , t * 2 ) belong to the intersection of the graphs of the best response functions of players 1 and 2 and are characterized by the following relationŝ
Proposition 3.5. In cases (14), (15) and (19) the unique Nash equilibrium is fast-slow, (t
). In cases (16), (20) and (21) the unique Nash equilibrium is slow-fast, (t + 1 , t − 2 ). In cases (17) and (18) the game of timing has precisely two Nash equilibria, fast-slow, (t − 1 , t + 2 ), and slow-fast, (t + 1 , t − 2 ). Proposition 3.6. Let the game of timing have two Nash equilibria, i.e., (17) or (18) hold. Then
, moreover, the inequality is strict if and only ift 2 < t
, moreover, the inequality is strict if and only ift 1 < t + 1 . Let us conclude the general part of our study with the description of an algorithm that finds the Nash equilibria in the game of timing.
Step 1. Use definitions for finding the players' fast and slow choices, t
Step 2. Use definitions (12) and (13) for finding the players' switch times,t i (i = 1, 2).
Step 3. Use Proposition 3.5 for identifying the Nash equilibria.
GAS PIPELINE GAME
Let us apply the suggested solution method to a model described in (Klaassen et al., 2001) .
The cost C i (t i ) for finalizing the construction of pipeline i (i = 1, 2) at time t i is defined to be the minimum of the integral investments
Here λ is a positive discount. An investment strategy of player i is modeled as an integrable control function,
that brings the accumulated investment, x i (t), from 0 to the prescribed commercialization level
The dynamics of x i (t) is modeled aṡ
Here σ is a positive obsolescence coefficient and γ (0 < γ < 1) is a delay parameter.
In the supply game arising at time t, the strategies of player i are nonnegative rates of supply, y i , and the payoff to player i is defined as
Here y is the total rate of supply, π(t, y) is the price of gas and c i (t) > 0 is the cost for extraction and transportation of gas for player i. The price of gas is modeled as
where g(t) > 0 is the consumer's GDP (gross domestic product) at time t and β (0 < β < 1) is the inverse to the price elasticity of gas demand.
Assumption 5.1. Let us assume that
Proposition 5.1. For player i (i = 1, 2) the following formulas hold.
1. The cost, C i (t i ), is given
where
2. The rate of cost reduction, a i (t i ), is given by
3. The upper benefit rate, b i1 (t i ), is given by
4. The lower benefit rate, b i2 (t i ), is given by
5. The following inequality is valid
Assumption 5.2. Assume that the consumer's GDP, g(t), and costs, c i (t), grow exponentially,
(ζ and ω are nonnegative), and
where 
for j = 1, 2 respectively.
Let us assume that g(t) and c i (t) (i = 1, 2) are given by (33) and inequality (34) is satisfied. Formulas (30) and (31) for b i1 (t) and b i2 (t) are specified as
Proposition 5.3. For i = 1, 2 the following relation is valid
5. CASE STUDY Let us consider the game of timing in application to the Caspian and China gas markets. The values of the model parameters are based on preliminary expert estimates. Our first case study deals with the competition of two major gas pipeline projects in the Caspian region, the "Blue Stream" project of the Russian GAZPROM Company (project 1) which is aimed at delivering Russian gas to Turkey under the Black Sea; and the "Trans-Caspian" project (project 2) directed from Turkmenistan underneath the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey. In this case study the parameters of the model are chosen as follows -the discount rate: λ = 0.1; the obsolescence coefficient: σ = 0.3; the delay coefficient: γ = 0.65; the inverse to the price elasticity of gas demand: β = 0.55; the initial level of the consumer's GDP: g 0 = 214.6; the growth rate of the consumer's GDP: ζ = 0.1; the growth rate of the extraction costs: ω = 0.15; the initial extraction costs: c For these parameters there exist two Nash equilibria in the game of timing, the fast-slow equilibrium (t In this case study there exists the unique, slowfast, Nash equilibrium (t 
CONCLUSIONS
The paper is devoted to the analysis of a twoplayer game, in which the players' strategies are times of terminating innovation processes. In the game between the projects the total profits act as payoffs and commercialization times as strategies. The analysis of the game leads to the restriction of player's rational choices to no more than two prescribed combinations of commercialization times, which constitute the Nash equilibria in the game. An algorithm for finding all the Nash equilibria is described.
